Shaqshaqiya (literally, "roar of the camel"), in which Alī lays out his claim to the caliphate and his superiority over his predecessors

[2] Amīr al-mu’minīn has referred to Abu Bakr’s accession to the Caliphate metaphorically as having dressed himself with it. This was a common metaphor. Thus, when ‘Uthmãn was called to give up the Caliphate he replied, “I shall not put off this shirt which Allāh has put on me.” No doubt Amīr al-mu’minīn has not attributed this dressing of Caliphate to Allāh but to Abu Bakr himself because according to unanimous opinion his Caliphate was not from Allāh but his own affair. That is why Amīr al-mu’minīn said that Abn Bakr dressed himself with the Caliphate. He knew that this dress had been stitched for his own body and his position with relation to the Caliphate was that of the axis in the hand-mill which cannot retain its central position without it nor be of any-use. Similarly, he held “I was the central pivot of the Caliphate, were I not there, its entire system would have gone astray from the pivot. It was I who acted as a guard for its organization and order and guided it through all difficulties. Currents of learning flowed from my bosom and watered it on all sides. My position was high beyond imagination but lust of world seekers for governance became a tumbling stone for me and I had to confine myself to seclusion. Blinding darkness prevailed all round and there was intense gloom every-where. The young grew old and the old departed for the graves but this patience-breaking period would not end. I kept watching with my eyes the plundering of my own inheritance and saw the passing of Caliphate from one hand to the other but remained patient as I could not stop their high-handedness for lack of means.” NEED FOR THE PROPHET'S CALIPH AND THE MODE OF HIS APPOINTMENT. After the Prophet of Islam the presence of such a personality was inevitable who could stop the community from disintegration and guard the religious law against change, alteration and interference by those who wanted to twist it to suit their own desires. If this very need is denied then there is no sense in attaching so much importance to the succession of the Prophet that the assemblage in Saqifah of Banu Sã‘idah should have been considered more important than the burial of the Prophet. If the need is recognised, the question is whether or not the Prophet too realised it. If it is held he could not attend to it and appreciate its need or absence of need it would be the biggest proof for regarding the Prophet’s mind to be blank for thinking of means to stop the evils of innovations and apostasy in spite of having given warnings about them. If it is said that he did realise it but had to live it unresolved on account of some advantage then instead of keeping it hidden the advantage should be clearly indicated otherwise silence without purpose would constitute delinquency in the discharge of the obligations of Prophethood. If there was some impediment, it should be disclosed otherwise we should agree that just as the Prophet did not leave any item of religion incomplete he did not leave this matter either and did propose such a course of action for it, that if it was acted upon religion would have remained safe against the interference of others. The question now is what was that course of action. If it is taken to be the consensus of opinion of the community then it cannot truly take place as in such consensus acquiescence of every individual is necessary; but taking into account the difference in human temperaments it seems impossible that they would agree on any single point. Nor is there any ex-ample where on such matters there has been no single voice of dissent. How then can such a fundamental need be made dependent on the occurrence of such an impossible event — need on which converges the future of Islam and the good of the Muslims. Therefore, mind is not prepared to accept this criterion. Nor is tradition in harmony with it, as al-Qāḍī ‘Adud ad-Din al-‘Iji has written in Sharh al-mawãqif: You should know that Caliphate cannot depend upon unanimity of election because no logical or traditional argument can be advanced for it. In fact when the advocates of unanimous election found that unanimity of all votes is difficult they adopted the agreement of the majority as a substitute for unanimity, ignoring the difference of the minority. In such a case also it often happens that the force of fair and foul or correct and incorrect ways turns the flow of the majority opinion in the direction where there is neither individual distinction nor personal merit as a result of which competent persons remain hidden while incompetent individuals stand forward. When capabilities remain so curbed and personal ends stand in the way as hurdles, how can there be expectation for the election of correct person. Even if it is assumed that all voters have independent unbiased view, that none of them has his own objective and that none has any other consideration, it is not necessary that every verdict of the majority should be correct, and that it cannot go astray. Experience shows that after experiment the majority has held its own verdict to be wrong. If every verdict of the majority is correct then its first verdict should be wrong because the verdict which holds it wrong is also that of the majority. In this circumstances if the election of the Caliph goes wrong who would be responsible for the mistake, and who should face the blame for the ruination of the Islamic polity. Similarly on whom would be the liability for the bloodshed and slaughter following the turmoil and activity of the elections. When it has been seen that even those who sat in the audience of the Holy Prophet could not be free of mutual quarrel and strife how can others avoid it. If with a view to avoid mischief it is left to the people of authority to choose anyone they like then here too the same friction and conflict would prevail because here again convergence of human temperaments on one point is not necessary nor can they be assumed to rise above personal ends. In fact here the chances of conflict and collision would be stronger because if not all at least most of them would themselves be candidates for that position and would not spare any effort to defeat their opponent, creating impediments in his way as best as possible. Its inevitable consequence would be mutual struggle and mischief-mongering. Thus, it would not be possible to ward off the mischief for which this device was adopted, and instead of finding a proper individual the community would just become an instrument for the achievement of personal benefits of the others. Again, what would be the criterion for these people in authority? The same as has usually been, namely whoever collects a few supporters and is able to create commotion in any meeting by use of forceful words would count among the people of authority. Or would capabilities also be judged? If the mode of judging the capabilities is again this very common vote then the same complications and conflicts would arise here too, to avoid which this way was adopted. If there is some other standard, then instead of judging the capabilities of the voters by it why not judge the person who is considered suitable for the position in view. Further, how many persons in authority would be enough to give a verdict? Apparently a verdict once accepted would be precedent for good and the number that would give this verdict would become the criterion for future. al-Qāḍī ‘Adud ad-Din al-‘Iji writes: Rather the nomination of one or two individuals by the people in authority is enough because we know that the companions who were strict in religion deemed it enough as the nomination of Abu Bakr by ‘Umar and of ‘Uthmãn by ‘Abd ar-Raḥmãn. (Sharh al-mawãqif, p.351) This is the account of the “unanimous election” in the Hall of Bani Sã‘idah and the activity of the consultative assembly : that is, one man’s action has been given the name of unanimous election and one individual’s deed given the name of consultative assembly. Abu Bakr had well under-stood this reality that election means the vote of a person or two only which is to be attributed to common simple people. That is why he ignored the requirements of unanimous election, majority vote or method of choosing through electrol assembly and appointed ‘Umar by nomination. ‘A’ishah also considered that leaving the question of caliphate to the vote of a few particular individuals means inviting mischief and trouble. She sent a word to ‘Umar on his death saying: Do not leave the Islamic community without a chief. Nominate a Caliph for it and leave it not without an authority as otherwise I apprehend mischief and trouble. When the election by those in authority proved futile it was given up and only “might is right” became the criteria — namely whoever subdues others and binds them under his sway and control is accepted as the Caliph of the Prophet and his true successor. These are those self-adopted principles in the face of which all the Prophet’s sayings uttered in the “Feast of the Relatives,” on the night of hijrah, at the battle of Tabuk, on the occasion of conveying the Qur’ānic chapter “al-Barã‘ah” (at-Tawbah, chap.9) and at Ghadir (the spring of) Khumm. The strange thing is that when each of the first three caliphates is based on one individual’s choice how can this very right to choose be denied to the Prophet himself, particularly when this was the only way to end all the dissentions, namely that the Prophet should have himself settled it and saved the community from future disturbances and spared it from leaving this decision in the hands of people who were themselves involved in personal aims and objects. This is the correct procedure which stands to reason and which has also the support of the Prophet’s definite sayings.